Let us take Russell's contradiction to be the two-fold claim that if it is true that the round square is both round and square then it is true, first, that the round, non-round square is both round and not round, and, second, that the existent golden mountain both exists and does not exist. Both cases appear contradictory. The first argument is countered by distinguishing between not being <pe -,<px) and being non-<p (non-<px) and holding that while '-,<px iffnon-<px' may hold for all existents, it does not hold for non-existents or "incomplete" objects. Thus, since (1X)( <px & non-<px) does not exist, it can be both <p and non-<p without acknowledging the contradiction that it both is and is not the case that it is <po This can be taken to accept:
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where 'x' ranges over existents and non-existents. This blocks the first but not the second case, since by the Meinongian Sosein Principle (MSP), that for any <p, (1X)(<pX & ... ) is <p, and Meinong's non-limitation of assumption, the existent round square exists; yet, of course, it does not exist. With existence, the trick with negation cannot be played, even if one distinguishes non-existence from not-existing. Thus, Meinong's distinction between so-being and being is developed to distinguish, in the tradition of Aquinas' and Kant's rejection of the ontological argument, between "nuclear" properties like golden and non-nuclear concepts like existence.
To avoid Russell's problem, one insists that existence is not a eonstitutive property or eoneept and 'exists' not a predieate that ean oeeur inside a deseription. But Meinong and some Meinongians try to avoid such a dec1aration as eonstituting a limitation on the freedom of assumption. So the dialeetie advanees a further step and arrives at the modal moment and the watering down of being. A eontemporary Meinongian has tried to explain why Meinong ean take his existenee undiluted, avoid the algebra and regresses of modal moments, allow for deseriptions like the existent golden mountain, and bypass Russell. I The idea is that 'the existent golden mountain' and 'the golden mountain' denote the same non-existent objeet, but judgments expressed in terms of the different deseriptions differ in content. In short one allows for the term 'existent' to oeeur in the deseription, but takes 'the existent golden mountain is golden' to express a judgment that the golden mountain as existent is golden -that the golden mountain exists and is golden. As the differenee between the judgments is now relegated to the realm of content, the judgment that the granite temple on the Aeropolis is pink is "about" the marble temple, and not about a non-existent objeet.
2 Problems of Meinong interpretation, and questions about differenees in his earlier and later views, aside, on the view offered the glorious, golden, eireular halo hovering over my head (surely a non-existent objeet) ean, by such neo-Meinongian magie, beeome the eireular bald spot on my head that is neither glorious nor golden nor, unfortunately, non-existent. This "streamlining" of Meinong might save Santa Claus and Pegasus as Ausserseins, but not my halo l. D. Jacquette, "Meinong's Doctrine of the Modal Moment", Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25/26, 1985/86. 2. This is reminiscent of a familiar criticism ofRussell' s theory of descriptions that rests on the specious distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions. To see why it is specious, assume one names an English child 'the present King of France'. Is the phrase (token) so used adefinite descriptive phrase? The point is that if it is appropriate to point out that the child is neither a King nor French then the expression is attributive as weil as referential. If it is taken as "purely" referential, Iike a name or label, then, in spite of its linguistic form, it is not adefinite descriptive phrase. As Russell distinguished between logically proper names and (ordinary language) grammatically proper names, one must distinguish between logically proper descriptions and grammatically descriptive phrases in the context of a perspicuous schema.
